IS AMERICAN VIOLENCE
A CRIME PROBLEM?
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INTRODUCION

By long-standing habit, Americans use the terms "crime" and
"violence" interchangeably. When we express concern about urban
conditions, we commonly talk about "the crime problem" or "the
violence problem" as if they were the same thing. When drive-by
shootings create newspaper headlines, we demand that our elected
officials do something about crime.
As a matter of strict definition, the equation of crime and
violence is incorrect. Criminal violence is the intentional and unjustified infliction or threatened infliction of physical injury to a
human being.' Crime is a much broader category, referring to all
violations of the criminal law. The question we consider in these
pages is whether there is actual harm in confusing crime and violence when making policy-whether it is an error to address violence in the United States as a crime problem.
The standard of judgment we propose for this question is a
pragmatic one. We are not concerned here with definitional niceties; we are concerned only with the sorts of mistakes that waste
material resources and opportunities to save lives and alleviate
public fears. We will demonstrate in these pages that regarding
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crime and violence as interchangeable social problems is a policy
mistake of substantial significance.
The empirical justification for regarding American violence as
a crime problem can be simply stated. Almost all serious, intentionally inflicted personal injuries in the United States are also
violations of the criminal law. Because such violence violates the
standards of our criminal code, our violence problem is a crime
problem as well. It is, however, an elementary mistake to assume
that because most violence is criminal it is also true that most
crime is violent.
There is no reason to assume that the large portion of crime
in the United States that does not involve violence or the threat
of violence-more than 80%-is similar to the less than 20% of
crime that is violent.' There is no reason to assume that the sorts
of people who commit violent criminal acts are indistinguishable
from the sorts of people who commit nonviolent criminal acts.
There is also no reason to assume that the same conditions function as the proximate causes of both violent and nonviolent incidents. Finally, there is no reason to assume that countermeasures
that succeed in reducing nonviolent crime will have equivalent
success in reducing the incidence and seriousness of violence. Yet
those who regard American violence as a crime problem all too
frequently do assume that unjustified intentional personal injuries
involve the same protagonists, the same causes, and the same
solutions as other forms of criminal behavior.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides a context for the consideration of American violence with a series of
international comparisons. Part II presents a sustained analysis of
robbery, an offense that combines elements of theft and violence
and which results in thousands of homicides each year in the
United States. Part Ill discusses the degree to which public fear,
which we usually think of as a fear of all sorts of crime, is more
narrowly focused on the threat of violence. Part IV addresses the
errors in policy that are likely when crime and violence are regarded as interchangeable categories.

2. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1992: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 8 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS] (reporting statistics for the eight "index crimes" of murder/non-

negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny.theft,
motor vehicle theft, and arson).
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Published scholarship on the specific topics covered in this
analysis is not yet extensive. Cross-national comparisons of crime
are a recent phenomenonI although international comparisons of
homicide have a slightly longer history.4 The first multi-national
crime victim survey was executed in the late 1980s.' The goals of
this Article are to use existing data on violence and crime to determine what Americans really fear and to shape future research
on violence, crime, public fear, and public policy.
I.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Los Angeles and Sydney
Los Angeles is the second largest city in the United States,
with a 1992 population estimated at 3.6 million by its crime statistics reporting unit.6 It is a multiracial, multicultural city on the
Pacific coast with a crime rate that by most accounts is its most
serious civic problem.7 Sydney, located on Australia's Pacific
coast, is also a city of approximately 3.6 million.' While
multicultural by Australian standards, the ethnic and language
mixture falls far short of that in Los Angeles. Crime in Sydney is
a serious annoyance, but not a major threat to the continued
viability of the city or to the health and welfare of its citizens.'

3. See, ag., James P. Lynch, Crime in InternationalPerspective, in CRIME 11 (James
Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995); Richard R. Bennett & James P. Lynch, Does a
Difference Make a Difference? Comparing Cross-NationalCrime Indicators, 28 CRIMIN OLOGY 153 (1990).
4. See, eg., DANE ARCHER & ROSEMARY GARTNER, VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECIvE (1984).
5. See Jan J.M. van Dijk & Patricia Mayhew, Criminal Victimisation in the
Industrialised World- Key Findings of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys, in
U.N. INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INST., UNDERSTANDING CRIME:
EXPERIENCES OF CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL 1, 2, U.N. Doc. UNICRI/Publ./No. 49,

U.N. Sales No. E.93.III.N.2 (1993) (discussing the first international crime survey, which
took place in 1989).
6. See 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 93 tbl.6.
7. See New Answers Pose Difficult Questions; Survey Redirects Focus to Crime and
Related Issues, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at B12.
8. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, YEAR BOOK AUSTRALIA 1995, 95 tbl.
5.5 (1994).
9. Proof of a negative is a notoriously difficult task. One of us, Hawkins, has lived
in Sydney since 1961 and served as Director of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Sydney for 23 years. There is no survey research in Australia to parallel the
Field Poll in California, see infra note 44 and accompanying text; indeed, the absence of
such a survey is one datum suggestive of the difference between the level of fear in
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Figure 1 compares the volume of four crimes reported by the
police in Sydney and Los Angeles by expressing the number of
offenses in Sydney as a percentage of the Los Angeles crime volume. Since the population of the two cities is the same, the crime
volume comparison is also a crime rate comparison.

Figure 1
SYDNEY CRIME VOLUME COMPARED TO

Los ANGELES, 199210
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The "theft" category reported at the far left of Figure 1 includes most forms of stealing that lack elements the law regards as
California and in Sydney. Other indications include the minor role accorded crime rates
in Australian state and national political campaigns, and the absence of tabloid stories on
the risks of crime and violence (in contrast to frequent, sensational treatment of individual violent crimes). Although murder has great fascination for the Australian public, we
have seen little evidence of personal terror in that country.
10. See 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 112 tbl.8 (Los Angeles
statistics); NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, COL-

LECTED DATA FOR 1992 (on file with author) (Sydney statistics).

figures for theft do not include motor vehicle theft.

In Figures 1-4, the
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increasing the gravity of the offense. Theft is the most common
offense reported in all cities," and the two jurisdictions under review are no exception. Sydney reports just over 90,000 theft incidents, roughly three-quarters the volume reported in Los Angeles.
Burglary is an aggravated form of theft where the offender
breaks and enters private property in order to commit a
crime-usually, to steal. 2 The volume of such crimes in Sydney
in 1992 exceeded 63,000, about 10% more than the number of
burglaries reported in Los Angeles.
The pattern noted for burglary contrasts sharply with robbery,
the other major category of aggravated property crime. Robbery is
defined as the taking of property from the person of another by
force or by the threat of force. Los Angeles reported 39,508
robberies in 1992, while Sydney reported 4,942, one-eighth the Los
Angeles rate. The ratio of burglaries to robberies in Los Angeles
is just under 3:2; the ratio of burglaries to robberies in Sydney is
greater than 12:1.
The final crime category reported in Figure 1 is for homicides
resulting from intentional injury. There were fifty-three such offenses reported by the police in Sydney during 1992, a crime volume equal to 5% of the 1,094 homicides reported by the Los
Angeles police that same year. The difference between the two cities in rates of criminal homicide exceeds a factor of ten. The citizens of Sydney can thus live with their high crime rate in relative
comfort because they are not dying from it in large numbers.
Figure 2 reorders the same data used in Figure 1 so that Los
Angeles is depicted using Sydney rates as a base.

11. In the United States, larceny-theft accounts for 56% of all index crime. See FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTGAnON,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRME IN THE UNIMD

STATES 1994: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 8 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS].
12. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCoTr, JP., CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13 (2d

ed. 1986).
13. See id. § 8.11.
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Figure 2

Los ANGELES CRIME VOLUME COMPARED TO SYDNEY, 199214
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Figures 1 and 2 carry visual, statistical, and substantive lessons
about crime and violence in the two cities. Visually, the use of
Sydney rates as the basis of comparison means that the scale of
the figure must be expanded: the theft and burglary representations are dwarfed by the distended bar values necessary to show
Los Angeles violent offenses on a Sydney scale.
The statistical conclusion one draws from an inspection of
Figures 1 and 2 is that the nature of the comparison between
Sydney and Los Angeles depends on what is being compared. For
theft and burglary the two cities are quite similar. For robbery,
they are vastly dissimilar; for homicide, the 20:1 difference is
huge.
The substantive conclusion to be drawn from the statistical
pattern can be stated in two ways. First, it seems beyond dispute
that what separates the two cities is not so much the amount of

14. See 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 112 tbl.g (Los Angeles
statistics); NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, COLLECTED DATA FOR 1992 (on file with author) (Sydney statistics).
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crime they experience, but rather the character of the crime they
experience. However, we think the point can be put more sharply:
what is distinctive and threatening in Los Angeles is not a crime
problem, but a problem of lethal violence.
B. New York and London
New York is the largest city in the United States, with a
population just past seven million.'" London has a city population
of about 6.6 million. 6 Figure 3 shows London crime rates per
100,000 using New York rates as a standard for comparison.
Figure 3
LONDON CRIME RATES COMPARED TO NEW YORK, 19907
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15. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1990: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 101 tbl.6 (1991) [hereinafter 1990
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
16. See 2 EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK 2675 (31st ed. 1990).
17. See 1990 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 15, at 101 tbl.6 (New York
statistics); RESEARCI AND STATISTICS DEP'r, GREAT BRITAIN HOME OFFICE, COLLECTED DATA FOR 1990 (on file with author) (London statistics).

Rates are per 100,000.
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The statistical comparison in Figure 3 is even more surprising
than that concerning Los Angeles and Sydney, and to the same
effect. London has 67% more theft than New York and a burglary
rate that is 57% higher. But the robbery rate in London is less
than one-fifth the robbery rate in New York, and the homicide
rate in London is less than one-tenth the New York figure. Figure
4 shows New York rates compared to London.
Figure 4
NEW YORK CRIME RATES COMPARED TO LONDON, 199018
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The total number of offenses per 100,000 citizens in Figure 4
is slightly higher in London than in New York. If overall crime
rates were the problem, Londoners should live in greater fear or
New Yorkers in relative complacency. But with a robbery rate five
times those of London and a death rate eleven times as high, the
population of New York is far from comfortable. Violence is New

18. See 1990 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 15, at 101 tbl.6 (New York
statistics); RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DEP'T, GREAT BRITAIN HOME OFFICE, COLLECTED DATA FOR 1990 (on file with author) (London statistics). Rates are per 100,000.
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York's problem, not crime, and lower rates of general theft are no
consolation for huge death toll differences.
If readers are wondering if these data are selective and misleading or if the numbers are skewed by the peculiarities of different reporting systems, the next set of comparisons should provide
some reassurance that our city comparisons are part of a broad
and consistent pattern.
C. Twenty Countries
We can show clearly that America's special problem is violence and not crime by comparing the results of a twenty-nation
survey in which citizens reported their crime victimization rates
with World Health Organization data on death from assaults for
the same nations. Figure 5 shows the violent death rates for the
five nations with the highest overall crime levels, then the next
highest group of five, and so on.
There are several indications that a country's crime rate is
substantially independent of its violence rate. First, the variation in
violent death rate is quite large within each separate crime rate
category. Within the group of highest crime nations, the homicide
rates vary by a factor of ten, in the next group by a factor of five,
in the third group by a factor of three, and in the lowest crime
group by a factor of eight. In contrast, the median homicide rates
for the different crime categories are clustered between 1.3 and 2.2
per 100,000. So knowing which general crime rate category a country belongs in does not tell you much about that country's rate of
violent death.
Similarly, a country's rate of violent death does not predict
much about its crime rate. The country with the lowest rate of
violent death (England) has a crime rate just over average. The
country with the next lowest rate of violent death is Japan, which
has the lowest crime rate. Tied for third lowest violent death rate
are the Netherlands and Spain, which are in the highest and second highest crime rate groups, respectively. The pattern is just as
opaque at the top of the violence distribution. The most violent
country, the United States, has a high crime rate as well. The next
most violent country, Northern Ireland, is in the lowest crime rate
group.
This data set provides a multinational illustration of the central point that lethal violence is the problem in the United States.
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It shows the United States clustered with other industrial countries
in crime rate, but head and shoulders above the rest in violent
death.
Figure 5
VICTIM SURVEY CRIME RATES AND HOMICIDE
RATES FOR TWENTY COUNTRIES 19
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Judging from Figure 5, the United States has about the same
rate of crime and prevalence of criminality as the Netherlands and
Australia. But ours is by far the more dangerous country to live
in. We currently have a Netherlands-size crime problem and a
king-size violence problem that threatens the social organization of
our cities. Which problem should we try to solve?

19. Van Dijk & Mayhew, supra note 5, at 26 tbl.3 (victim survey crime rates);
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS passim (1990) (homicide

rates).
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II. AMERICAN ROBBERY: CRIME OR VIOLENCE?

Robbery is both a very important part of American violence
and also representative of most violence in the United States.
Indeed, it is not possible to comprehend violence in America without understanding the motivation and outcomes of American robbery. And it is not possible to understand robbery in America-why it occurs so often, why it kills so frequently-without
coming to terms with violence as a phenomenon separate from the
motivations and conduct norms that govern most forms of crime.
The standard legal definition of robbery is the taking of property by force or by threat of force.' It is thus both a property
crime and a crime of violence. It is a property crime that, unlike
theft and burglary, directly threatens the physical security of its
victims. It is a crime of violence that, in all its heterogeneous
forms, occurs more than half a million times a year in the United
States, striking many more victims than rape2 ' and reaching
across boundaries of social and economic class far more often than
does serious assault, which usually involves victims and offenders
who are acquainted. 2 Robbery is the stranger-to-stranger crime
that most frequently results in victim death and injury in the United States, accounting for over 2,000 deaths per year, or nearly
50% of all the killings that are classified by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as "felony murders."'
If any category of life-threatening behavior would appear to
support the conclusion that American violence is a natural outgrowth of high levels of American crime, it would be robbery.
Material gain is the objective of this behavior, unlike most violence, so it is proper to think of the behavior that leads to the risk
of bodily injury in robbery as the means used by the actor rather

20. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, § 8.11.
21. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993 352 tbl.3.107 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore

eds., 1994) [hereinafter 1993 SOURCEBOOK]. Over 672,000 robberies and about 109,000
rapes occurred in 1992. See iL
22. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 53.5% of incidents of aggravated
assault with injury occur between non-strangers. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994 235 tbl.

3.11 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995) [hereinafter 1994 SOURCEBOOK].
23. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 380 tbl.3.125. Of the 4,887 felony murders known and suspected by the police in 1992, 2,254 occurred during known robberies.
See iL
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than as his end. There is thus a similarity between robbery as an
instrumental behavior and other criminal conduct designed to
achieve the unauthorized taking of property. Yet two puzzling
features of robbery in the United States point to the conclusion
that the injury and death associated with American robbery should
not be considered a natural consequence of the high volume of
crime in the United States. First, why is robbery the crime of
choice for so many offenders in the United States when other
forms of property crime are more lucrative and less dangerous?
Second, why do robbery events so frequently lead to injury and
death? This high death rate is a mystery because a dispassionate
analysis of failure to obtain property from a stranger who refuses
to cooperate should lead an unthreatened robber to disengage and
seek another victim.
A. An IrrationalCrime?
Those who believe that criminal behavior is governed by rational principles find it hard to explain the persistence of high
rates of robbery in the United States.24 The muggings and armed
robberies that alarm city dwellers turn out to be a terrible way to
make a living. Only a minority of American robberies are directed
at commercial establishments with large amounts of cash.' Even
the rewards for such hard-target robberies are far from commensurate with the risks involved. Many commercial establishments are
well-defended against robbery, with alarm systems and armed
guards. The arrest rate for commercial robberies is relatively
high,2 6 and the more lucrative the robbery target, the greater the
chance of detection. The majority of bank robberies are cleared by
arrest, even in cities where the clearance rate for burglaries is no
more than 15%.27 The unplanned street robberies that constitute
24. The position that criminal behavior is governed by rational principles is associated with the work of Cesare Beccaria. See, eg., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PuNIsHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) (1764). Its modem expression is most associated with Gary Becker, whose 1968 article on the economics of crime and punishment
has been widely influential. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
25. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 392 tbl.3.143.
26. See Franklin E. Zimring & James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 tbl.18 (1986) [hereinafter Chicago
Study].
27. Compare The Oregon Bank Robbery Crisis: Finding New Law Enforcement Strategies: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy
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the majority of all robberies' generate a risk of arrest that is
smaller than that for commercial robbery but larger than the risks
associated with larceny or burglary.29 Moreover, the cash rewards
for street robbery are usually pitifully small-under $250 on average.3" Those who persist in robbery are almost always eventually
caught and usually imprisoned.3 ' On a risk-reward basis, no crime
against property makes less sense in the United States than robbery.
Yet it is precisely the $250 armed robbery that kills thousands
of victims a year, that causes prisons to overflow, that makes us
appoint blue-ribbon commissions to study the crime problem. Why
then does this behavior persist in the streets of urban America?
The high volume of robbery in the United States certainly
seems irrational if we think of potential offenders as motivated
only by the desire to acquire property when making choices
among the various possible criminal means of acquisition. This
model of choice assumes no skill requirement on the part of the
potential offenders for either violent or nonviolent means of acquisition. It further assumes that there is no special utility-enjoyment, for example-associated with a particular criminal
means of acquisition.
But what if the domination of another human being by threat
has positive utility for a potential offender?32 Or what if an
of the House Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong., 97-98 (1989) (statement of
Danny 0. Coulson, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (approximately 75% of bank robberies are cleared in Portland, Oregon) with CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1990, supra
note 15, at 163 tbl.20 (average clearance of burglaries in cities of Portland's size is under
15%).
28. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 392 tbl.3.143.
29. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,' INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 89 tbl.5.1 (1995) [hereinafter INCAPACrrATION].
30.

See, eg., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992 258-59 tbl.3.16 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds,
1993) [hereinafter 1992 SOUREBOOK].
31. See MARK A. PETERSON ET AL, WHO COMMITS CRIMES: A SURVEY OF PRISON
INMATES 21 tbl.9 (1981). This inmate survey contains powerful evidence of the distinctly
high risks of robbery as a criminal enterprise. Thirty-four percent of the prisoners surveyed confessed to having committed armed robbery, and 35% had been convicted of
robbery. See id. In contrast, while 46% confessed to having committed burglary, only
15% had been convicted of that crime; and though 39% confessed to having sold drugs,
only 18% had been convicted of any type of drug offense. See id. Assuming the relative
risks for inmates are equivalent to those for all offenders, the chances of escaping arrest
for repeat robbery are quite low.
32. See JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS
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offender's habits and skills render him better prepared to acquire
property by intimidation than by stealth? Only in these circumstances-when robbery is easier than other crimes or when it provides noninstrumental satisfaction to the offender-does the election to commit robbery approach rational behavior under current
conditions.
But if either the possession of assaultive habits and skills or
the enjoyment of intimidation are necessary to explain the American tendency toward robbery, then high levels of robbery should
best be seen as a spillover from general tendencies toward violence, and not as a separate behavioral system operating independently of other factors that condition violent behavior in a social
system. On this view, robbery should be regarded as the violent
man's property crime; and the best predictor of the level of robbery in a particular setting may not be the general level of property crime, but rather the general level of violence.
B. The Mystery of Robbery Killings
The second puzzle concerns the high rate of injury and death
associated with robbery in the United States, particularly when the
robbery victim is unwilling to hand over money or property. The
injury or death of a robbery victim is not difficult to explain when
the victim responds with resistance of a kind that puts the robber
in jeopardy. And studies have shown that death rates of victim
injury increase in such circumstances.33 But the victim death rates
also increase when the person threatened simply does not have
any money or property to give up.34 Since both the risk of apprehension and the potential punishment escalate when the victim is
killed,35 the rational robber would be well-advised to respond to
such circumstances by avoiding conflict and seeking another victim.
Yet frequently a frustrated robber uses lethal force in response to noncooperation by a victim whose resistance poses no
immediate threat whatever to the robber. In the Zimring and
Zuehl study of urban robbery in Chicago, the most significant

DOING EVIL 167 (1988) (discussing a survey of prison inmates in which 40% of the
"violent predators" agreed that the thrill of confronting an armed victim was part of the
motivation to commit the crime).
33. See Chicago Study, supra note 26, at 17-18.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 27 tbl.17.
IN
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predictor of death in urban robbery was whether the victim was
active in not cooperating with his or her assailant. 36 "Active noncooperation" cases included refusal and flight, as well as resistance
with physical force.37 These cases had a death rate fourteen times
as great as robberies where there was no resistance.38 Cases
where the victim denied having any money were about twice as
likely to result in the death of the victim as cases in which the
victim offered no resistance, but only one-seventh as lethal as
active noncooperation.39
Why would a robber shoot a stranger who refused to hand
over property when a killing increases the offender's chances of
being caught by a factor of four' and, moreover, threatens the
law's maximum punishment?
We think that one fruitful approach to this problem would be
to regard all attempted robberies as potential social conflicts. Even
if the offender and victim are strangers initially, the victim's refusal to cooperate in the robbery creates a contest of wills that may
explain the high rate of lethal violence in cases of refusal. The
robber experiences refusal as a challenge to his authority and
credibility. All too often this challenge is met with life-threatening
violence. The most plausible reason why refusal to cooperate with
a robber generates a high risk of the use of lethal force is that the
offender takes refusal personally.
If the foregoing analysis is an accurate explanation of the
death rate from robbery, the common theme in robbery assaults
on strangers and conflict-motivated assaults between acquaintances
is apparent. Violent assault in the United States is very often a
matter of maintaining status, combatting disrespect, and standing
up to challenges to personal authority and "manhood.'
The
same motivation and the same kind of conflict probably are found

36. See id. at 17-19. However, the victim's resistance may sometimes be a result,
rather than a cause, of the robber's intent to injure. See id. at 19.
37. See id.at 17-18.
38. See id. at 18.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 27 tbl.17.
41. The gender-specific term "manhood" is used intentionally here: according to the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, 86% of those arrested for violent crimes in 1994 were
male. See 1994 UNiFoRM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 11, at 217; see also KATZ, supra
note 32, at 237-47.
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in a high proportion of the robbery attempts that result in serious
injury and death.
This background permits us to specify in some detail what we
mean when we say that the death rate from robbery in the United
States should not be regarded as a crime problem. The acquisition
of property by criminal means is as widespread in London and
Sydney as it is in New York and Los Angeles; London has just as
much crime as New York and just as many criminals. 42 But the
consequences of crime in other developed nations are relatively
trivial. The crime problem in most industrial nations is loss of
property, not danger to life. In Sydney, the chance of being killed
by a robber, burglar, or purse snatcher in 1992 was less than 1 in
500,000.43
In the United States, however, it is the overlap of the tendency to favor the use of personal force with the desire to acquire
property by criminal means which results in high rates of robbery,
injury in robbery, and killing in robbery. As we have demonstrated, the preference for robbery is due neither to lower risk nor to
greater material rewards than other forms of property crime. Thus,
it is more appropriate to regard violent robbery as an aspect of a
larger propensity toward violence than it is to view it as part of a
broader pattern of crimes against property. Given the considerable
risks involved, and the relatively modest rewards, robbery is the
violent man's property crime. A high volume of robbery therefore
must reflect the character and tastes of the individuals who perpetrate it-and perhaps of the society from which they come.
III. CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND CITIZEN FEAR
The sharp contrast between levels of violent crime in Sydney
and Los Angeles invites us to consider the relationship between
rates of life-threatening personal violence and public perceptions of
the seriousness of crime as a problem. As measured by the political importance of crime as an election issue, or the degree to
which fear of crime is mentioned as a major disorganizing influ-

42. See supra Part I.A-B.
43. The New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research reported two
burglary killings and five robbery killings in the Sydney statistical division, with a population of 3.6 million. See Letter from Roseanne Bonney of the New South Wales Bureau
of Crime Statistics and Research to Franklin Zimring (Aug. 24, 1995) (describing analysis
performed by Bonney) (on file with author).
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ence on urban life, Sydney does not seem to have a significant
crime problem. To be sure, housebreakers are not popular figures
in New South Wales and complaints about crime are quite common-but terror is not.
Los Angeles is a city where fear of crime and of criminals is
arguably the single most important social and political issue for the
majority of citizens. Public opinion surveys reflect this difference
to some degree, but they do not capture the palpable difference
between crime as an annoyance in Australia and crime as a fundamental threat to social life in Los Angeles. The annual statewide
Field Poll, which ranks Californians' concerns on approximately
thirty different issues, consistently reports that crime is at or near
the top of the list.' Concern about policy toward criminals dominated the 1994 California elections to an extent that would be
unthinkable at any level of government in Australia.' The intensity of citizen concern in California is also reflected in the demand
for substantial changes in criminal justice policy. The prison population in California grew over 400% in the fifteen years prior to
the 1994 elections,46 but California voters nevertheless overwhelmingly supported a referendum in 1994 that required a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for anyone convicted of a third felony
if the offender's previous convictions had been as serious as
housebreaking.47
Since general levels of nonviolent crime in Sydney and Los
Angeles are closely similar, why not conclude that it is levels of
lethal violence rather than of crime generally that determine the
degree of public fear? Why else would similar numbers of criminals and rates of crime lead to such a sharp cleavage in public
response? The question is an important one, but far from easy to
answer with confidence. Evidence regarding the relationship be-

44. See Edward Epstein, Californians List Crime No. 1 Issue; Survey's Results Reflect
Election-Year Campaign Trend, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 1994, at A15 (crime rated top concern in 1993, 1994); Job Worries Recede in State Poll, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Oct. 4,
1995, at All (crime tied with schools as second most important concern in 1995; AIDS
rated top concern).
45. See, eg., Dan Smith, Gov. Wilson's Theme: Crime, Immigration, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Nov. 3, 1994, at Al.
46. See FRANKLIN E. ZMIRING & GORDON HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY IN CALIFORNIA xi, 5 (2d prtg. 1994) [hereinafter PRISON
POPULATION].

47. See Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, California Elections/Propositions: Voters Approve "Three Strikes" Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A3.
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tween rates of different types of crime and public attitudes is
surprisingly sparse, and the specific question of the influence on
attitudes of rates of violence rather than rates of crime generally
has not been systematically addressed.
There are two different issues involved in determining the
relationship between rates of violence and public fear: the salience
of violence as a focal point for citizen fear and the influence of
rates of violence on levels of public concern about violence. On
the first issue the answer seems clear: when citizens are afraid of
crime, it is life-threatening personal violence that dominates their
attention. On the second issue, the evidence is far from clear.
While the objective risks of violence undoubtedly influence the
level of public fear, so also do many other variables. And the
extent to which different levels of public concern can be explained
by differences in objective risk is not known.
To characterize concern about serious personal violence as the
dominant image in public fear of crime may seem like an overstatement. Residential burglary does not entail great danger to
life,48 but residential burglary is a crime that Californians greatly
fear. Including residential burglary as a triggering felony in the
California "three strikes" sentencing proposal was vigorously supported by the public even though it tripled the cost of the program.49 Is this not evidence that nonviolent threats are as salient
to individuals as violent ones?
Probably not. Public fear of burglary is most likely associated
with images of the worst thing that could happen in the course of
a housebreaking, rather than the kind of things that usually do
happen when burglars appear. The majority of burglarized dwellings are unoccupied at the time of the invasion. 0 But the image
of burglary which provokes public fear is of the burglary of an
occupied dwelling. The great majority of burglars would react
48. We compared the number of deaths resulting from burglary reported in the FBI
Supplemental Homicide Reports for 1992 with the number of reported burglaries and
estimated 0.7 deaths per 10,000 burglary incidents. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE AND THE AMERICAN PROS-

PECT ch. 4 (forthcoming 1997). The same analysis estimated a robbery victim death rate
of 34 per 10,000 acts, or 50 times the burglary death rate. See id.
49. Franklin E. Zimring, "Three Strikes" Law Is Political Fool's Gold, CHRISTIAN
SCa. MONIrOR, Apr. 11, 1994, at 23.
50. Only about 10% of all burglaries involve occupied dwellings. See JAMES D.
WRIGHT ET AL, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 139

(1983).
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nonviolently in any interaction with household members.51 But
the image of burglary that produces high levels of citizen fear
finds the victim defenseless in bed and at risk of being murdered.
It is the worst-case burglar that engenders high levels of public
fear regarding residential burglary.
But the worst-case burglar does not explain the contrast between Sydney and Los Angeles. Why would housebreakers provoke much more fear in Los Angeles than in Sydney? One reason
might be the fact that many people have homogeneous images of
"the criminal"v-they do not think of robbers and burglars as different sorts of people, but rather imagine the criminal offender
who threatens their sense of security as a composite of the personal characteristics of the criminal offenders that they have heard
about. If this homogeneity-of-image phenomenon exists, citizens
who live in environments where homicidal attacks are common
will fear all kinds of contact with criminal offenders much more
than citizens whose composite image of the criminal offender is
formed in an environment that exhibits less lethal violence.
In an urban environment where armed robbery frequently
leads to the death of victims, the purse snatcher and the burglar
will acquire much of the threatening character of the robber because the composite, generalized image of the criminal that conditions public fear acquires the characteristics of the lethal armed
robber. The fear generated by the kidnap and murder of Polly
Klaas5" provokes long sentences for residential burglars because
the burglar in the citizen's scenario has acquired the characteristics
of Polly Klaas's killer.
High levels of interpersonal violence could thus generate a
process we call categorical contagion, whereby citizens come to
fear many forms of criminal behavior because they imagine that
they are all committed by extremely violent protagonists. Lower
general levels of violence may be associated with less pressure
toward categorical contagion because there are fewer incidents of

51. See supra notes 48 & 50.
52. The abduction and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas by Richard Allen Davis, an
ex-convict on parole for a previous kidnapping with a criminal record that included multiple felony convictions, sparked the popular campaign for the "three-strikes" legislation
and constitutional amendment in California. See Mary Curtius, Jury Recommends Death
Penalty for Polly Klaas' Killer, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, at Al.
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frightening violence to condition the citizen's image of the criminal
threat.
Processes of categorical contagion may operate in social life
well beyond the frontiers of the criminal code. Concern about
vulnerability to assault can produce fear of a wide variety of social
encounters, including rudeness and incivility and even face-to-face
contact with strangers in the streets if those strangers are seen as
threatening. If a person carries profound feelings of physical vulnerability into a social setting, daily activities are disrupted as
ambiguous or even innocuous behavior produces substantial anxiety. This process of categorical contagion also may work in reverse, so that a high level of anxiety about strangers or face-toface interaction expresses itself as a fear of becoming a victim of a
violent crime. Just as substantial anxieties about being robbed or
attacked may make a person apprehensive about encountering
strangers, an intense but nonspecific fear of strangers or foreigners
or minorities may produce more specific concerns that the subjects
of apprehension intend to commit assault.
When arguing for physical vulnerability as a citizen's core
concern, we do not want to suggest that this preoccupation will be
found to the same degree at all stages of social and economic
development. It is ironic that modern industrial nations do a better
job of protecting their citizens' property interests from criminal
threats than of protecting their bodily security. Insurance can provide compensation for the loss of most property interests. Moreover, because citizens in a modern state do not keep all their
money under their mattresses, many property interests are not
vulnerable to trespassory taking. Citizens can keep their money in
banks and the state can provide depositors with insurance that will
repay them if the bank fails. The private sector provides mechanisms of insurance to purchase replacements for automobiles that
are stolen or for personal property that is carried away by burglars. But even where it exists, financial compensation for the
victims of violence cannot restore what is lost in the same sense
that the insurance company can enable one to purchase a new
Chevrolet. Life insurance, of course, can provide financial benefits
to the family or dependents of the victim. This is important, but
the deceased is not brought back to life. For this reason, the more
successful a society is in providing its members with security of
property, the more concentrated its citizens' fear of violence will
be.
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If concerns about personal safety are paramount to citizens of
a modem industrial society, what factors predict variations in the
level of such concerns? This is a complicated question and one
that has not been squarely addressed in the social science literature on the fear of crime. We would expect at least three major
influences on the level of fear regarding serious crime: 1) the
amount and seriousness-i.e., the actual risk-of violent crime; 2)
the level of fear-arousing social conditions in the immediate physical environment of the subject; and 3) the amount and perceived
seriousness of fear-arousing cues in the mass media and the personal social universe of the subject.
How important is actual risk in the mix of cues that produces
varying levels of citizen fear of violence? We would expect variations in the actual risk of serious violence to be a major determinant of levels of fear, exerting influence in a variety of ways. The
higher the rate of serious violence, the greater the chance that the
average citizen will have been a victim of violence or will have
some social relationship to a victim of violence. The greater the
risk of serious violence, the stronger the associations between fear
of this violence and cues in the citizen's immediate social environment: the higher the number of people shot, stabbed or mugged,
the more fearful citizens are of dilapidated buildings or
threatening-looking strangers. Finally, we would expect both that
the number of social cues and the amount of media attention to
violence would be directly influenced by the rate and seriousness
of violence (although we are more confident of the relationship
between risk and the fear-arousing contacts of the citizen than in
the relationship between risk and the amount and character of
media cues about violence).
We would expect to find a positive association between risks
of life-threatening violence and the amount of public fear. But
variations in risk are by no means the only influences on levels of
public fear of violence. Processes of categorical contagion will link
levels of public fear of violence to fluctuations in other social conditions that make people anxious and insecure. Furthermore, to
the extent that the character and quantity of media attention to
violence fluctuates independently of trends in actual risk, this
variable will also influence levels of fear, particularly among
groups that lack more direct experience with violence. It thus
seems probable that fear of violence in 1990s America is to some
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extent a creation of the media, independent of changes in other
social conditions.
What we do not know is the maximum level of public fear
that can be produced and sustained in an environment of general
social anxiety, but low levels of lethal interpersonal violence. An
attempt to import an American-style "law and order" campaign
into the electoral politics of a nation with low death rates from
violence might tell us whether fear can be sustained without high
rates of death.
A similar issue concerns the generality of fear induced by
incivility and disorder. James Q. Wilson and George Kelling have
argued persuasively that indications of incivility and disorder produce citizen fear.53 One reason such indications could arouse fear
is that they convey to many people the message that they are
vulnerable to more direct and more violent predation. But will the
level of fear produced by disorder and incivility be as great where
rates of lethal violence are low as it will be where those rates are
high? The extent to which fear of lethal violence and fear of concentrated threats to public order feed off each other should be a
priority concern in the social psychology of crime.
IV. CRIME POLICY AS VIOLENCE POLICY

Life-threatening violence is, of course, against the public policy of the modern state in all but exceptional cases, but so are a
wide variety of acts that range from larceny to illegal drug consumption to sexual exploitation of children. What then is wrong
with public policy that treats violence as one of the many crime
problems that are best addressed by police, prosecutors, and prisons?
This section discusses some of the difficulties associated with
misdefining American violence as solely a crime problem. In pursuing this analysis we do not deny that crime in the United States
is destructive, costly, and disorganizing. Rather, we argue that it is
the violent strain in American social life which causes the special
destruction and disorganization produced by American crime.
There are three hazards associated with making general crime
control policy the dominant governmental and social response to

53. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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violence: 1) the narrowness of a crime policy perspective; 2) the
failure to address noncriminal sources of potential violence; and
3) the diffusion and loss of priority that result when violence is
principally addressed as part of the American crime problem. Part
A will provide a general outline of these objections. Part B will
illustrate many of these problems with the historical record of
recent American "wars" on crime.
A. Three Objections
1. Narrowness of Perspective. The first problem we encounter
when violence is regarded as a crime problem is that it tends then
to be regarded as only a crime problem, properly addressed with
the usual tools and processes of the criminal justice system. The
first difficulty with this narrow view of violence prevention is that
current criminal justice processes do not seem to be very
successful in combatting any form of crime, so limiting the
campaign against violence to available anti-crime mechanisms is
not a promising approach.
The assumption that the rate and seriousness of our lifethreatening violence is a natural outgrowth of a high volume of
crime and criminals also falsely diagnoses the problem. It is widely
believed that the reason the United States suffers particularly from
violent crime is that America has so many criminals.54 That is, if
violence is a crime problem, the most natural and obvious cause is
an excessive amount of criminals and whatever social processes
may be responsible for that surplus. This diagnosis is demonstrably
false.
Recall the comparative incidence of theft, burglary, and robbery in Sydney and Los Angeles. For every ten theft offenses
reported in Sydney, Los Angeles reports just over thirteen such
offenses.55 The supply of thieves in the two communities would
seem to be at rough parity. The distribution of one form of aggravated theft, burglary, lends further support to the hypothesis of
equivalent criminogenesis-for every ten burglaries reported in

54. See, eg., Robert Dole, "I Will Restore the Promise of America" Speech Accepting the Nomination for Presidential Candidate at the 1996 Republican National Convention, in WASH. PosT, Aug. 16, 1996, at A36 ("I mean to attack the root cause of crime:
criminals.").
55. See supra Figures 1-2.
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Sydney, Los Angeles counts nine. 6 But for every ten robberies
reported in Sydney, there are eighty in Los Angeles." The significant contrast between the two cities does not involve the number
of offenders any more than it involves the number of offenses. It
is only the kind of crime that differentiates the cities, so that
searching for the causes of crime generally as a means of addressing the particular problem of violence in Los Angeles is barking
up the wrong tree.
It is not helpful to respond that the reason other countries
have similar crime rates and much lower rates of violence is that
cities in the United States have different types of criminals and
crime. This merely begs the question of why American crime is so
much more likely to include life-threatening violence. The central
fact obscured by regarding violence as principally a crime problem
is that our rates of lethal violence cannot be implied, predicted, or
explained by our general level of crime or population of criminals.
2. The Fallacy of Underinclusion. A related problem is that
searching for the sources of violence only in the caseload of the
criminal courts will miss many processes of great importance in
generating violence. A propensity for violence is characteristic not
only of American crime, but also of many other aspects of
American social life. Only a minority of Los Angeles homicides
grow out of criminal encounters like robbery and rape.58 A far
greater proportion of Los Angeles homicides grow out of
arguments and other social encounters between acquaintances.59
At the same time, violent social encounters often go relatively
unnoticed-usually, only those arguments that produce great injury
and come to the attention of the police are counted in official
crime statistics. Most of the processes that generate the risk of
lethal violence are not analyzed.
Why should arguments in Los Angeles lead to so much more
loss of life than in Sydney? It is likely that the same social tendencies that make crime more dangerous in Los Angeles also

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Stranger killings in 1992 comprised just under one-third of all cases where the
relationship between victim and offender was known (24% of all cases). See FEDERAL
BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE RE-

PORTS 1976-1992 (1st ICPSR version, 1994) (CD-ROM).
59. See id.
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make barroom fights and arguments among co-workers more likely
to be life-threatening. The tendency toward life-threatening violence in the United States is neither limited to a discrete criminal
class nor confined to criminal patterns of behavior. The same
social tendencies that predispose American offenders to robbery
more often than their foreign counterparts also make arguments
more lethal in California than in New South Wales.
Violence in the United States is a problem that is both different from and broader than the problem of criminal offenses in
general. The social values and processes that we must study to
fully understand American violence are unlikely to be confined to
those who commit violent crimes. To confine the search for explanations of American violence to criminal behavior and offenders is
grossly underinclusive.
3. Diffusion of Focus. If violence in the United States is a
much broader problem than crime, it is also the case that the
range of criminal behavior in America is not limited to violence.
Most offenses and most offenders are not violent. In Los Angeles,
for example, only 26% of index crimes in 1992 involved the use or
threat of personal violence.' When nonindex offenses such as
drug sales and possession are added, the proportion of crimes
involving violence declines to under 15%.61
Thus, if only 15% of crime involves violence, a general anticrime policy will miss the target (if violence is the target) 85% of
the time. A related problem is the lack of any explicit priority
given to punishing and controlling violence. The best illustration of
the practical impact of unfocused anti-crime crusades is found in
recent American history.

60. See CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES 1992, supra note 2, at 94. In 1992, 88,919
crimes were categorized as violent out of a total of 338,531 index crimes reported in Los
Angeles. Id.
61. Because violent offenses are more likely to lead to arrest than nonviolent ones,
see INCAPACITATION, supra note 29, at 89 tbl.5.1, using the percentage of arrests attrib-

utable to violence as an index of the percentage of offenses that are violent will overstate the true ratio of violent to nonviolent offenses. But approximately 1.5 million of the
10,949,388 arrests reported in 1994 were for offenses of violence, or 14% of the total.
See 1994 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 11, at 221 tbl.32.
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B. The ParadoxicalPriority Impacts of Crime Wars
The recent dramatic increase in resources devoted to the
punishment of crime' provides a case study of the impact that a
general crackdown on crime has on policy toward violent crime.
The paradox of the crime crackdown is this: as fear of violence is
translated into a general campaign against crime, the share of
extra resources that is directed to violent crime will tend to decrease. When penal resources are scarce, the priority given to
more serious offenses means that violent crimes will receive a
large share of the most serious punishments. As a result, expanding punishment resources will have more of an effect on cases of
marginal seriousness than on those that provoke the greatest degree of citizen fear.
Under most criminal justice policies, serious violent crimes
result in prison sentences when offenders are apprehended. Armed
robbery, attempted murder, and offenses of equivalent magnitude
are seriously punished even before special efforts to increase penal
severity are introduced; no matter how small the prison, we tend
to make room for Charles Manson. This pattern of serious punishment means that there is less room left in the system to get tough
with this sort of offense.
Instead, crime crackdowns have their most dramatic impact on
less serious, nonviolent offenses that are close to the margin between incarceration and more lenient penal sanctions. This pattern
of nonviolent offenses absorbing the overwhelming majority of re-

sources in crime crackdowns is clearly illustrated by the recent
history of criminal justice policy in the United States. From 1980
to 1990, for example, the state of California experienced what
might be described as the mother of all crime crackdowns. In ten

years, the number of persons imprisoned in California quadrupled,
and the population of those incarcerated in the state's prison and

jails increased
Figure 6
policy on the
of convictions
and 2.

by over 100,000.6'
shows the impact of this unparalleled "get tough"
growth in California's prison population as a result
for the four offenses that were profiled in Figures 1

62. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRiNG & GORDON HAWKINs, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT
ch. 5-6 (1991).
63. See PRISON POPULATION, supra note 46, at 3-6.
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Figure 6

PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN PRISONERS BY OFFENSE
OF CONVICTION, CALIFORNIA, 1 9 8 0- 1 9 9 0 64

Total Increase In

Homricide

Robbery

Burglary

Theft

The relative growth in prison population for the two nonviolent offenses is greatly in excess of the growth experienced for
robbery and homicide. The relative growth of the number of burglars in prison was over three times that of the number of robbers,
and the growth rate of prisoners convicted of theft was over six
times the rate for robbers.
The relatively modest impact of California's crime crackdown
on violent offenders is not a result of lenient attitudes toward
robbery and murder in California. Quite the opposite; since robbery and murder have always been seriously punished in California, there was a smaller number of leniently treated robbers and
killers who had been spared by the previous regime and were thus
available to be swept up by the crackdown.

64. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECIIONS, CALIFORNIA PRISONS 1980 tbls.27A,
27B (1981); CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND PAROLEES tbl.20 (1990).
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This tendency for changes in criminal justice policy to have
the most profound effect in marginal cases produced sharp changes
in the composition of California's prison population from 1980 to
1990. Sixty percent of all California prison inmates in 1980 had
been committed for offenses of violence (i.e., assault, rape, homicide, or robbery); but only 29% of prisoners added between 1980
and 1990 had been convicted of violent offenses.' If one imagines that the efficiency of an anti-crime policy as a way of combatting violence can be measured by the proportion of offenders
imprisoned for violent offenses, the prison resources available in
1980 had a 60% efficiency rating, while the additional resources
committed to imprisonment during the 1980s were employed with
29% efficiency.
The national pattern is less pronounced, but it also shows that
proportions of violent offenders shrink as prison populations increase. In 1979, 58% of the 263,553 persons in state prisons had
been convicted of a violent offense.66 But only 40% of the
440,628 additional prisoners that were incarcerated in 1991 had
been convicted of crimes of violence.67 This diminished overlap
between imprisonment and violence is in large measure an inevitable consequence of substantial increases in the proportion of felony offenders sentenced to prison. The current approach creates an
enormous gap between the motive for crime crackdowns and their
effects.
For those who wonder why both violence and the rate of
imprisonment have been going up, we present the parable of the
bait-and-switch advertisement. The practitioner of bait-and-switch

65. Each year, the California Department of Corrections publishes a distribution of
prisoners by most serious offense of current conviction. The 60% figure is derived from
that data for 1980; the 29% estimate was obtained by subtracting 1980 offense specific
totals from the 1990 offense-specific totals and then categorizing the offenses as either
violent or non-violent. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA PRISONS
1980, supra note 64, at tbls. 27A, 27B (1981); CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND PAROLEES, supra note 64, at tbl. 20 (1990).
66. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1987 620 tbi.6.39, 638 tbl.6.65 (1988) [hereinafter 1987
SOURCEBOOK].

67. The 1992 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics reports a total of 328,148 violent offenders in state prisons in 1991 (46.6% of 704,181). See 1992 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 30, at 623 tbl. 6.70. The total number of violent offenders estimated in 1979 was
152,861 (58% of 263,553). See 1987 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at 620 tbl.6.39, 638
tbl.6.65. Thus, the total number of additional violent offense prisoners was 175,287, or
40% of the expanded volume.
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selling advertises a brand-new vacuum cleaner with several attractive features for the unheard-of price of $39.95. That advertised
product is the "bait" designed to lure customers into the store.
When the consumer enters the shop, advertisement in hand, he is
either told that the advertised special is no longer available or is
shown an obviously defective piece of merchandise and actively
discouraged from its purchase. The salesperson then attempts to
"switch" the consumer by interesting him in the $300 vacuum
cleaner that the whole scheme was designed to promote.
The bait-and-switch character of anti-crime crusades is revealed in the contrast between the kind of crime featured in the
appeals to "get tough" and the type of offender who is usually on
the receiving end of the more severe sanctions. Willie Horton-the
violent criminal-is the "bait" in the usual law-and-order campaign.68 But the number of convicted violent predators who are
not already sent to prison is rather small.69 Thus, the advertised
special is unavailable when the customer arrives at the store. The
only available targets for escalation in imprisonment policy are the
marginal offender and the marginal offense. Under these circumstances, to accomplish an increase in rates of arrest, conviction and
imprisonment, the target of the policy must be "switched" to nonviolent offenders. The result: nonviolent offenders go to prison and
citizens wonder why rates of violence continue to increase.
CONCLUSION

Rates of lethal violence are much higher in the United States
than in other Western industrial nations, even though rates of
common property crimes in the United States are comparable to
those found elsewhere. This penchant for life-threatening violence
cannot be the result of a high volume of either crime or criminals;

68. Horton, a convicted murderer who raped a woman and stabbed her fiancee after
escaping from a Massachusetts prisoner furlough program, became a central figure in the
1988 presidential campaign when his story was featured in a campaign advertisement for
then-Vice President George Bush criticizing Massachusetts governor and Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis. See, e.g., Dan Rodricks, Trying to Find the Real Willie Horton,
BALT. EVENING SuN, Aug. 12, 1993, at lB. The use of Horton's story was attacked for
playing on racist fears as well as the fear of violent crime. See id.
69. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 97% of convicted murderers, 87% of
convicted rapists, 88% of convicted robbers, 72% of those convicted of aggravated assault, and 68% of those convicted of "other violent" offenses are sentenced to incarceration. 1994 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 22, at 487 tbl.5.50.
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if it were, other developed nations with high crime rates would
share our higher rate of violence. Other factors must be at work.
High rates of robbery, for instance, cannot come only from rational utility maximization on the part of offenders seeking easy ways
to make money by lawbreaking; a taste or preference for violence
must explain in part why robbery is a preferred method. In short,
American violence is not a crime problem.
Violence is the central concern of those who are afraid of
crime. But fear of nonviolent crime such as burglary can increase
in response to higher levels of personal violence, as citizens project
the murderous intentions they fear most onto a broad range of
crimes and criminals. This process of categorical contagion infects
the public's perception of crimes that in fact involve little objective
risk of violence.
Categorical contagion leads voters and policymakers to
conflate violent crime with crime in general. But "getting tough"
on crime in general is inadequate as an anti-violence strategy. If
lethal violence is the primary target of governmental concern, the
anti-crime crackdown is inefficient, diffuse in focus, and misses the
opportunity to look beyond the category of criminal behavior for
the sources of, and means to control, violence. The slight impact
of the last decade's significant increase in penal confinement has
demonstrated the inefficiency of anti-crime crusades as a means of
combatting violence. Until lethal violence is addressed specifically,
undifferentiated fear of crime will hobble efforts to prevent the
violent acts that are the root cause of this fear.

